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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 920815-CA
Category No. 2

vs.
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant §78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated

(1953), as

amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was

the

stop

of Appellant's

vehicle

a pretext

stop

requiring the suppression of evidence obtained from a subsequent
search?
2.

Did the prearrest detention void the search?

3.

Did the Appellant give consent to search his vehicle?

4.

If Appellant gave consent to search his vehicle, was his

consent voluntary?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
Constitution

of the United

States, Amendment

IV

[Unreasonable

searches and seizures]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with violating §58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) of the
Utah

Code

Annotated,

as

amended,

to

wit:

Possession

of

Controlled Substance, Cocaine, With the Intent to Distribute.

a

The

evidence was discovered during a search of Appellant's vehicle
after

having

been

stopped

for

an

alleged

speeding

violation.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of the stop and warrantless search of his automobile upon
the grounds that there was not a reasonable suspicion that the
driver had committed a traffic offense or was otherwise engaged in
criminal activity, that the detention of the Appellant following
the stop was unreasonable and without probable cause, that the
Appellant did not give consent to search his vehicle, and that any
consent deemed to have been given was not done so voluntarily.
suppression

hearing

was held

on November

7, 1991, before

A
the

Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District.

The State put on evidence in the form of the testimony

of Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, in support of its
burden

to establish

an exception to the Fourth Amendment

and

Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, requiring a warrant
for

the

seizure

of

evidence,

original stop and detention.

and

to

justify

the

Appellant's

Appellant and his co-defendant Mike

Lovegren testified concerning the illegality of the stop, the lack
of consent to search, and the circumstances surrounding the search.

2

The court took Appellant's motion under advisement and the parties
submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions.
On the 2 0th day of December, 1991, Judge Harding rendered a
written Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's suppression motion.
On May 27, 1992, a bench trial was held in Nephi, Utah.
the

Following

trial, the court took the matter under advisement, then on

July 9, 1992, issued another memorandum decision which found the
co-defendant Lovegren not guilty and Appellant guilty as charged.
Appellant was sentenced on October 22, 1992, and judgment was
entered on the 10th day of December, 1992.

Appellant filed his

appeal from the judgment and conviction on December 15, 1992.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Ray M.
Harding, Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of
Utah, entered on December 10, 1992.

In this appeal, Appellant

challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress
Evidence obtained as the result of the stop of his automobile as
well as the court's ultimate verdict of guilty.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All references cited herein are from the transcript of the
preliminary hearing as numbered in the transcript of preliminary
hearing.)
On

May

24th,

1993,

Appellant

and

a

co-defendant,

Mike

Lovegren, were travelling northbound on 1-15 in Juab County in the
vicinity of Nephi, Utah, in Appellant's vehicle.

Mr. Lovegren was

driving the vehicle and the Appellant was sitting in the front
3

passenger seat.

The parties had a radar detector in the vehicle

and the radar detector was in working order.
approached

the Nephi

As the vehicle

area, Mr. Lovegren noticed

a Utah

State

Highway Patrol vehicle in stationary in the median. He checked his
speedometer and determined the vehicle was going 60 mph.

As the

defendants were proceeding past the highway patrol, their vehicle
was passed by another vehicle which also passed two vehicles which
were ahead of the defendants1 vehicle.

Mr. Lovegren also passed

the two slower vehicles and then noticed the highway patrol vehicle
approaching defendants1 vehicle and saw the red light activated by
the patrolman.

The radar detector had not indicated the presence

of radar and Mr. Lovegren had not exceeded the speed limit. (Sup.
Hrg. p. 47-48)
Trooper Paul Mangelson approached the vehicle and asked for
driver's license and registration.

Trooper Mangelson found the

license and registration to be in order.

The trooper testified

that he smelled the smell of "burnt marijuana" as he talked with
the occupants of the vehicle.

He asked the defendants where they

had been and where they were going.

He then asked if they had any

contraband

as

in

the

vehicle,

such

guns,

drugs

or

alcohol.

Appellant responded that they had a six-pack of beer in the trunk.
The trooper asked again whether they had any drugs in the vehicle
to which the Appellant responded "No."

Trooper Mangelson then

stated "Do you mind if I look through the vehicle?"
asked, "Do you want to look in the trunk?"

Appellant

The trooper replied,

"Yes, I would like to look in the trunk and also the interior."
4

The trooper testified that at that point, both defendants said, "Go
ahead."

(Sup. Hrg. p. 5-8)

Appellant and co-defendant Lovegren

both testified that Appellant said "No," at which time the trooper
ordered the defendants to get out of the car and to stand by the
front of the car. (Sup. Hrg. p. 43, 46, 49, 53)

Trooper Mangelson

then searched the interior of the vehicle finding the contraband.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's vehicle was stopped as a result of a pretext
traffic violation, that after the stop, he was

illegally

and

unconstitutionally detained, and that no valid consent was given
for the search of Appellant's vehicle.

Further, the trial court

did not address issues raised by Appellant and did not apply the
proper standard of proof or legal analysis to the issue of consent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STOP OP THE APPELLANTS VEHICLE WAS A PRETEXT TO CONDUCT A
SEARCH AND SAID SEARCH WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

The Standard of Review and Standard of Proof

The standard of review for reviewing a factual finding by the
trial court is the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Thurmanr

846 P.2d

1256

(Utah 1993).

See State v.

However, a review of the

Memorandum Decision of the Court (Addendum, Ex.

) indicates that

the trial court did not treat the issue of the legality of the
stop,

although

raised

by Appellant

in Appellant's

memorandum.

Since the trial court did not treat that issue, this Court should
either remand this matter to the trial court to consider the issue
or, based upon the record, determine the issue from the record, it
5

being the Appellant's position that where the court has not treated
the issue in its decision, the clearly erroneous standard cannot
apply.
The appellate courts of this state have not

specifically

indicated which standard of proof the court must apply to weigh the
evidence

in a suppression

hearing•

This

Court was

asked

to

consider the issue in State v. Carter, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, but
declined to do so since the facts in that case would have led to
the same result under either the preponderance of the evidence
standard urged by the State, or the clear and convincing standard
urged

by the Appellant.

(Apparently

the Carter decision

was

recalled for revision after being published in the advance reports
and Appellant could not locate the revised opinion if it has been
reissued

at the time of filing the brief herein.)

Appellant

submits that in the present case there is an issue as to whether or
not the decision of the lower court would have been different had
the court used the preponderance of evidence standard as opposed to
the clear and

convincing

evidence

standard.

This problem

is

presented in both the case of the determination of the clearly
erroneous issues as well as the determination of the correction of
error

issues

involved

in reviewing

the conclusions

as to the

voluntariness of a consent.
There is no indication in the decision as to the standard of
proof used by the court to weigh the evidence.

Appellant suggests

that the standard of proof which should be used to measure evidence
at a suppression hearing should at least be that of the clear and
6

convincing

level of proof.

The court did not state that its

determination of the consent issue was based upon a clear and
convincing standard.

Had the court used the clear and convincing

evidence standard, Appellant suggests the court's determination
would have been different.

Without an indication by the court as

to which standard was used, a reviewing court cannot determine
whether or not the result would have been different with the
appropriate standard of proof used as a measure.
B.

The Traffic Stop by the Trooper Was a Pretext Stop

As set forth in the facts above, the trooper alleged that the
reason for the initial stop of Appellant's vehicle was that the
vehicle had exceeded the tolerance allowed by the trooper by one
mile per hour, indicating that his radar reading obtained on the
vehicle was 71 mph in a 65 mph zone.

This raises a factual dispute

in that Lovegren, the driver of the car, testified that shortly
prior to being pulled over, he had observed the patrol car parked
in the median and checked the speedometer, noting the speed to be
60 mph, and that the radar detector had not gone off.

He further

stated that a car passed the Appellant's vehicle and then passed
two other cars, at which time he also passed the two cars.

After

passing the two cars, he saw the patrol vehicle in his rear view
mirror and again checked the speedometer which indicated 60 mph.
Again, the radar detector had not indicated the use of radar.

He

indicated that although the officer indicated that the Appellant's
car was travelling at the rate of 71 mph with the reading being
obtained by his radar unit, and the trooper testified that the

7

radar unit had been locked to show the speed of Appellant's car,
when Lovegren was transported by the trooper following the arrest,
he saw the reading locked on the radar to be 77 mph.

The lack of

indication from the radar detector, which the parties testified had
been functioning prior to the stop, and the different reading from
the radar unit would indicate that the trooper had not obtained a
radar reading from the vehicle, but was using that reason as an
excuse to stop the Appellant to search for contraband.

Appellant

submits that this is not a case where the law enforcement officer
had no purpose for engaging in the misconduct.

The misconduct was

carried out in order to obtain consent to search the Appellant's
vehicle for drugs.

See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590

(1975),

holding that where the police conduct was engaged in as a pretext
for collateral objectives, and suppressing the resulting evidence
will have a greater likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in
the future, then evidence should be suppressed.
The state has the burden of proving that the trooper stopped
the vehicle based upon reasonable suspicion that the occupants had
committed

or were about to commit a crime, or

violation

that

"reasonable

would

officer11

normally

justify

standard.

a

After-acquired

cannot retroactively justify an illegal stop.
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988)].

stop

for a traffic
based

upon

probable

the

cause

[State v. Bairdf 763

As set forth herein, both occupants

denied that they were speeding, which position was bolstered by the
evidence that the radar detector did not indicate the use of radar
and that the reading on the radar gun was substantially higher than

8

that indicated by the trooper.

That evidence would indicate a

pretext stop.
However, even should the Court determine that the trooper's
version of the facts concerning the reason for the stop to be more
credible, the test is whether "a hypothetical reasonable officer,
in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or
her, would have stopped [the Defendants] to issue a warning...The
proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could have
made the stop."
1988).

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, at 978 (Utah App.

See also State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Ad. Rep. 1989).

Using

the totality of the circumstances test as required by United States
v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, Appellant submits that the state
has not met its burden to establish the factual basis for the stop
to be a legitimate

function of law enforcement

other than to

provide an opportunity for the trooper to search for drugs.
Although

this

issue was

raised

by

the Appellant

in his

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, the court's written
decision did not address the legality of the stop or analyze apply
the above

stated

guidelines to the

facts of this case.

The

decision denying Appellant's motion to suppress should be reversed.
POINT II
ASSUMING THE INITIAL STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER, THE
SUBSEQUENT AND EXTENDED DETENTION OP APPELLANT RESULTED IN A DE
FACTO ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
A.

Standard of Review

The standard for review for a determination of whether or not
the

detention

of

the Appellant
9

beyond

the

time

necessary

to

complete a traffic stop resulted

in a de facto arrest without

probable cause is that of the "correction of error" standard since
its

consideration

involves

a

question

of

law.

Although

the

Appellant raised the issue of unlawful extended detention in the
lower court, the trial court did not address that issue at all.
B.

The Appellant Was Detained by the Trooper for a
Constitutionally Unreasonable Time, Constituting an
Illegal Arrest.

Trooper

Mangelson

testified

that

once

he

stopped

the

Appellant's vehicle, he approached the vehicle and asked for the
operator's drivers license which was produced.

He then asked for

the registration to the vehicle which was produced.

He testified

that there was nothing improper about either the registration or
the driver's license and that as far as he knew, the vehicle was
being operated legally. (Sup. Hrg. p.16-17)
that when he

first approached

The trooper stated

the vehicle he smelled what he

recognized to be the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the
vehicle.

(Sup. Hrg. p. 17)

He also stated that he smelled the

strong smell of air fresheners coming from the vehicle, but the
smell

was

not

strong

enough

to mask

the

smell

of

the

burnt

marijuana. (Sup. Hrg. p. 19) He further stated that he observed no
physical evidence of illicit drugs prior to the search of the
vehicle.

After obtaining the license and registration information

and determining those documents to be in order, the trooper then
asked the Appellant where they had been and received information
from the occupants that they had been on a trip together to Las
Vegas. (Sup. Hrg. p. 22)

The trooper then asked if he could look
10

through the vehicle and received the responses from Appellant set
forth above.

The trooper then told them to get out of the vehicle

and go to the front of the car.

He then patted both individuals

down for weapons and found no drugs or paraphernalia. (Sup. Hrg.
p. 25-26)

The trooper testified that he did not detect the odor of

burnt marijuana

coming

from the persons

of the Appellant

and

Lovegren when he had them outside the vehicle and that the longer
he remained, the smell of marijuana was not as strong. (Sup. Hrg.
p. 38)

The trooper then began to search the vehicle during which

search he discovered contraband.
A police officer in Utah has been determined to be able to
legally detain a motorist stopped for a routine traffic matter long
enough to request a driver's license, vehicle registration, conduct
a computer check, and issue a citation.
P.2d

155.

However,

any

further

State v. Lovegren, 829

temporary

detention

for

investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for
the initial stop is justified only if the detaining officer has a
reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity.
Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431.

See State v.

Based upon the testimony of the trooper

that all he had observed which may have given him cause to believe
that the defendants were involved in some crime was the smell of
burnt marijuana which was not about the persons of the occupants,
and the smell of air fresheners, the only possible

reasonable

inference as to any crime which the parties may have committed
would be that of possession of marijuana butts or residue.

It is

interesting to note that in his exhaustive search of the vehicle,
11

he did not find any residue, butts or other evidence that would
verify his claim of smelling burnt marijuana. ( Sup. Hrg. p. 27-28)
Possession of marijuana being a Class B misdemeanor, Appellant
argues that that particular crime would not qualify as a "serious
crime11 which would justify further detention.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 U.S. 1, once a Fourth Amendment
seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons exceeding the scope
of

the

original

stop

and

not

reasonably

related

to

the

circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, is illegal.
(392 U.S. at 19-20.)

There is no question that the Appellant and

Lovegren were detained beyond the time required to complete the
traffic stop. There is also no question but that Trooper Mangelson
would not have allowed the parties to leave at any time following
the

stop.

The

following

responses

of

the

trooper

at

the

suppression hearing indicate his intention to detain the occupants
of the vehicle to investigate further:
Q.

At that point, were they free to leave?

A.

No, I don't think so.

Q.

You had your red light on did you not?

A. Well, it doesn't matter whether the red light was on or
not. They were not free to leave I don't believe. I mean if
they asked to leave, they would not have left.
Q.

They were detained by you?

A.

They were because of the smell.

Q. So your arrest of them was because of the smell of the
marijuana or your detention of them was because of the smell
of marijuana is that correct?
A.

Yes.
12

Q.
And that is even though you hadn f t found or seen any
physical marijuana or you hadn't seen any physical evidence of
anything else other than the smell of the marijuana?
A.

At that point?

Q.

Yes.

A.

The point where they asked me to look in the trunk?

Q.

Yes.

A. You know at that point they just as well have said, that
we have got contraband, we have got drugs because in essence
they told me in their body language, their actions.
Q.

Their actions told you they were nervous about it?

A.

At that point, they were not free to go.

Q. Okay, now at that point you had intended to detain them
for further search?
A.

For the

—

Q.

At the point you smelled marijuana?

A.

Yes, I asked, yes.

Q. At that point, you intended to detain them for further
search?
A.
The

That is why I asked.

foregoing

considered

the

indicates

that

occupants

to

without
be

question,

detained

although

the
he

officer
had

no

objective evidence other than the smell of burnt marijuana was not
evident on the persons of the occupants, and body language upon
which to base probable cause to continue holding the Appellant.
This is similar
Godina-Luna.

826

in that respect to the situation
P.2d

652,

where

during

in State v.

testimony

at

the

suppression hearing, the deputy sheriff making a traffic stop on
defendants indicated that the defendants were not free to leave at
13

any time during the stop.

The court therefore found that the

defendants were seized under the Fourth Amendment and that the
consideration at that point must center upon whether or not the
officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
justifying further detention of the defendants.

In Godina-Luna,

the officer also testified that the defendants appeared nervous and
that they were travelling to the indicated destination in a less
than direct route.

The appellate court upheld the trial court's

determination that the further detention and questioning concerning
drugs and contraband was improper and that the consent given by the
defendant was not voluntary under the circumstances.
While there have been some cases which have held that the
smell of burnt marijuana together with other factors may form the
basis of probable cause to search, in the present case, the trial
court issued its conclusions upon the validity of the consent and
did not find the search to be justified by the smell of burnt
marijuana.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT DID NOT GIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE
A.

The Standard of Review

The standard of review to be applied to review of a trial
court's determination of factual issues is the "clearly erroneous"
standard.

Appellant submits that the evidence submitted to the

court concerning the facts and circumstances of the stop and claim
of consent by Trooper Mangelson clearly indicate that the trial
court's determination that Appellant consented to the search is
14

clearly erroneous.
B.

The Appellant Did Not Give Consent to Search the Vehicle,

There were three persons present at the time the consent of
the Appellant to search his vehicle was allegedly obtained by
Trooper Mangelson, the trooper, the Appellant, and Appellant's codefendant, Mike Lovegren.

The testimony of all three of them at

both the hearing on suppression of the evidence was consistent to
a point.

At the point in time that the trooper asked if he could

look in the vehicle, all parties agreed that the passenger, the
Appellant, replied with the question, "Do you want to look in the
trunk?11

The trooper responded, "Yes, and also the interior of the

vehicle." (Sup. Hrg. p. 8, 21, 42, 53) At that point, the testimony
of the Appellant and Mike Lovegren, although consistent with each
other, is at odds with the testimony of Trooper Mangelson.

Both

Appellant and Lovegren testified that neither of them consented to
the search of the vehicle.

In fact, Appellant testified, "Well,

there was no way I was ever going to tell him 'yes1.11 (Sup. Hrg.
p.43, 53)

At the time the trooper made his request to search the

vehicle,

the

trooper

stated

that

the

Appellant

appeared

"apprehensive." (Sup. Hrg. p. 8, 22)

and

Lovegren

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Florida v.
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, at 497, stated:
Where the validity of a search rests on consent, the state has
the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained
and it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not
satisfied by showing by mere submission to a claim of lawful
authority.
See also State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Ut. App.
1988) .
Voluntary consent is that which was in fact voluntarily given, and
15

not the result of duress or coercion, expressed or implied.

State

v. Arroyo, 102 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34 (Ut. App. 1989) and Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte,

412

U.S.

218

(1973).

The

Supreme

Court

in

the

foregoing case stated:
The issue of whether a person's consent to search is voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all circumstances. 412 U.S. at 219.
The issue of consent then contains two basic considerations.
First, whether or not express consent was given as claimed by the
trooper.

Second, whether or not, if given, said expressed consent

was voluntary or was a result of duress or coercion, which may be
express or implied.
At to the first consideration, Appellant submits that there
was no consent
position.

given and

the

facts of the case support

this

Appellant submits that the evidence before the trial

court of the circumstances surrounding the alleged consent support
the testimony of the Appellant that such did not occur. Appellant,
when first asked if he could look in the vehicle, did not say
"Sure, go ahead.11

He specifically limited his response to "Do you

want to look in the trunk?"

Appellant knew there were no drugs in

the trunk, but also knew that there was contraband in the interior
of the car.

When the trooper indicated that he wanted to search

the interior as well, then the Appellant responded "No."
Trooper

Mangelson

testified

that

his

inquiry

was

Although

directed

at

Appellant, he maintained that both driver and passenger responded
to his question with "Go ahead."

This is not consistent with the

fact that the trooper was having the conversation with Appellant as
16

the owner of the vehicle.
the

observation

of

This version is also not consistent with

the

apprehensive when asked

trooper

that

the

occupants

for consent to search.

appeared

The testimony

smacks of being tailored to avoid suppression by the court in the
event that either of the occupants attempted to do so by involving
them both in the consent. Upon Appellant's refusal to give consent
to search, the trooper ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and
told them to stand to the front then searched the interior of the
vehicle where he found the evidence.
Although

the

court

in

the

memorandum

decision

dated

December 20, 1991, found that the Appellant and Lovegren had given
consent, Appellant submits that finding is not supported by any
evidence other than the inconsistent statement of the trooper.
POINT IV
THE CONSENT, IF GIVEN, BY APPELLANT WAS NOT GIVEN VOLUNTARILY
A.

The Standard of Review

The standard for review of the issue of the voluntariness of
consent has been determined by the Utah State Supreme Court to be
that of the correction of error standard.

See State v. Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256, at 1262 (Utah 1993).
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Its Determination That the
Consent of the Appellant to Search the Vehicle Was
Voluntary.

The decision

of the trial court that the consent of the

Appellant, if given, was given freely and voluntarily, is erroneous
under the facts presented at the suppression hearing.
requires

the

court

to

determine
17

this

issue

by

This issue

applying

the

"totality of all the circumstances11 consideration.
the trooper is telling.

The attitude of

Trooper Mangelson admitted that although

he has access in his patrol car written consent forms which would
clearly establish the consent of Appellant, that he doesn't use
them

because

they

are too hard

to get

into

court.

He

also

testified that whether the Appellant consented to the search or not
did not matter because he was going to search anyway, and that the
consent was merely a formality.

The trooper responded during cross

examination at the suppression hearing as follows:
Q. Now you recall that it had been Mr. Delaney that had been
conversing with you about the trunk and about the alcohol and
so forth, but it is your recollection that both these
individuals said, "Go ahead"?
A.

They both did, yes.

Q.

You are positive they didn't say, "No"?

A.

I am positive.

Q.

Had it not have made any difference to you?

A.

It really wouldn't have done, no.

Q.

You had determined to search anyway, is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q. So actually obtaining consent was a formality as far as
you were concerned?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Do you have any written consent forms that you have
available for your use?
A.

We do.

Q.

Do you carry those around with you in your patrol car?

A.

I do.

Q.

Do you use those?
18

A. I have used about two of them in the past last three or
four years.
Q.

Why didn't you use that consent form at this time?

A.

Why didn't I?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I just didn't think it was necessary.

Q. Was that because you had already determined you were going
to search, whether they gave their consent?
A.

Probably.

Yes, that could have a bearing on it.

Q. If you had a concern about whether or not you had probable
cause to search or whether or not you should conduct a search
at that point, you may have used the form I take it?
A. May have done. My experience has been with obtaining a
consent is that once you start using that, things start
getting more complicated than with going without.
Q.

In other words, the defendants may refuse the search?

A.
Well, not only that, it is harder to get a consent to
search into court, a signed consent, than it is a verbal
consent. That has been my experience.
The above-quoted portion of testimony supports the Appellant's
contention that the trooper was not concerned with consent, and was
obviously not concerned about whether or not the Appellant knew he
had a right to refuse because it made no difference to the trooper.
This attitude is one of the end justifying the means. A reasonable
conclusion is that the trooper was going to search and then justify
the search later.
In the case of State v. Harmon, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, this
Court

stated

the

following

in

regard

to

the

matters

to

be

considered in determining whether a consent to search is voluntary:
In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal,
19

specific, and freely and intelligently given; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived. 215 Utah Ad. Rep. at 41.
The

court

defendant's

in

the

home

Harmon
was

case

freely

found

and

that

the

voluntarily

search

given

of

the

where

the

defendant was not claiming that she did not give consent, but that
her consent was coerced.

In that case, the defendant signed a

written consent form which the court

found to have

warned her of her right to refuse the search.

adeguately

In the present case,

although the trooper testified that he had written consent forms in
his possession in his patrol vehicle, he chose not to use them
because defendants may not consent as readily or the courts may not
be as willing to admit the evidence.

The last conclusion of the

trooper appears to be questionable, but the reasonable conclusion
to be drawn from the testimony of the trooper

is that he was

concerned that if he used the forms, the parties would refuse.
There is no evidence that he advised Appellant of any right to
refuse because regardless of the response from Appellant, he was
going to search.

Although the courts have not held that the

failure to make a defendant aware of the right to refuse does not
necessarily invalidate a consent, it has been determined to be one
of the factors to consider.
The trial court did not make a finding concerning any another
basis for the search other than consent and the court did not make
any

indication

that

the

court

applied

the

"totality

of

the

circumstances" consideration in or the analysis set out in the
20

Harmon decision requiring consideration of the three requirements
set forth therein.
of the court

Therefore, Appellant argues that the decision

in regard to voluntariness of consent should be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court in ruling that the Appellant's
Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his
vehicle should be reversed in that the trial court did not consider
and rule upon all of the issues presented by Appellant, and did not
indicate

what

standard

of proof was

reaching the evidentiary findings.

applied

by

the

court

in

Further, the trial court's

determination of the factual issue of whether or not the Appellant
gave consent was clearly erroneous in light of the weight of the
evidence.

Additionally, the trial court did not apply the proper

analysis to the issue of the voluntariness of the consent alleged
to have been given by Appellant and made no findings or indication
in the decision to indicate that the totality of the circumstances
was considered in arriving at the decision of the court.

The

decision concerning voluntariness represents an error of law and
should be corrected by this Court consistent with the facts of the
case.

Appellant's Motion to Suppress should have been granted and

his conviction should be reversed.
Dated this 12th day of July, 1993.
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ADDENDUM
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(f)
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Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTESWORTH
PlNCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM F E W ,

A M E N D M E N T II
[Right t o b e a r arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessarv to it,.. ...
curity of a free State, the right of the people i.. \<t....
!
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

ABR BALDWIN.

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before t h e
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is t h e Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, t h e United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and t h e Senators and
Representatives elected: That t h e Electors should
meet on t h e Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting t h e Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By t h e Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X I BILL OF RIGHTS!
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
(Religious a n d political freedom.!
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.1
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed bv law
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.!
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due p r o c e s s of l a w and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.!
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil c a s e s . |
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial byjury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
IBail — Punishment.l
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OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

stances listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a
licensed practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II is guilty of a second degree felony and
upon a second or subsequent conviction of
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized
by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed
from those present; however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the
evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior
unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled
substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any
physical condition requiring the administration of a controlled substance for immediate
relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled

58-37-8

substance in excess of medically recognized
quantities necessary to treat the ailment,
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to
another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other
personal information for the purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty
of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in
the form of an extracted resin from any part
of the plant, and the amount is more than
one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries
of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a
penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of
possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b),
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree
greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii),
or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a
second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B
misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class
A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction,
guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to
another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule
issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form,
statement, invoice, or information required
under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for
inspection as authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of
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78-3-4

<c» appeals from the juvenile courts;
id) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony:
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992

Section
78-3-17.5.

78-2a-4. R e v i e w of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
1986

78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
district courts is six years, and commences on the
first Monday in January, next following the date of
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
1988

78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT C O U R T S
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-3.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir78-3-4.
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when court does not exist.
Repealed.
78-3-5.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
State District Court Administrative
78-3-11.5.
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
Costs of system.
78-3-12.5.
Repealed.
78-3-13.
Counties joining court system — Pro78-3-13.4.
cedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
Allocation of district court fees and
78-3-14.5.
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.

78-3-18.
78-3-19.
78-3-20.
78-3-21.

78-3-22.
78-3-23.

78-3-24.
78-3-25.

78-3-26.

78-3-27.
78-3-28.
78-3-29.

78-3-30.
78-3-31.

Application of savings accruing to
counties.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
Purpose of act.
Definitions.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.
Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives.
Courts to provide information and statistical data to administrator of the
courts.
Annual judicial conference.
Repealed.
Presiding judge — Election — Term
— Compensation — Powers — Duties.
Duties of the clerk of the district
court.
Court commissioners — Qualifications
— Appointment — Functions governed by rule.

78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

78-3-4.

Repealed.

1971, 1981, 1988

Jurisdiction — Transfer of c a s e s to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
w h e n court d o e s not exist.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the
district court, which are also within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district
court in multiple judge districts or the district court
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon the motion of either party for adjudication.
When an order is made transferring a case, the court
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been
originally commenced in the circuit court and any

